Durable-Goods Monopoly with Privately Known Impatience: A Theoretical and Experimental Study by Guth, Werner et al.
Durable-Goods Monopoly with Privately Known
Impatience∗
 A theoretical and experimental study
Werner Güth, Sabine Krögerand Hans-Theo Normann§
June 27, 2002
Abstract
We analyze a durable-goods monopoly which sells a single unit of a good to
a buyer whose value of the good is private information. The discount factors of
the buyer and the seller may diﬀer and they are private knowledge. We solve
for the closed-form solution of a two-period game and compare this solution with
the behavior observed in laboratory experiments. The data are to a large extent
consistent with the predictions.
∗Financial support from the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft, SFB 373 and Max Planck Institute
for Research into Economic Systems is gratefully acknowledged. We thank Tim Grebe for his help by
running the experiment. Pio Baake and seminar participants at Max-Planck Institute Jena, Humboldt
University Berlin, Tinbergen Institute Amsterdam provided useful comments.
Max-Planck Institute for Research into Economic Systems, Kahlaische Str., D-07745 Jena, Germany,
(email: gueth@mpiew-jena.mpg.de).
School of Business and Economics, Humboldt University Berlin, Institute of Economic Theory III,
Spandauer Str. 1, D - 10178 Berlin, Germany, (email: skroeger@wiwi.hu-berlin.de).
§Department of Economics, Royal Holloway, University of London, Egham, Surrey, TW20, OEX,
United Kingdom, (email: hans.normann@rhul.ac.uk).
1 Introduction
Ever since Plato (1941)1 people seem to be aware that they may suﬀer from rational
anticipation of own future behavior. A very prominent intra-personal decision conßict is
one faced by a durable-goods monopolist (Coase, 1972). In a market with a durable good,
a monopolistic seller could easily collect the monopoly proÞt by excluding any future price
cut. Buyers will, however, anticipate that future prices are opportunistically chosen by
the monopolist; in particular, that the good will be sold cheaper in later periods. For this
reason, the monopolist loses market power. Coase conjectured that this can even lead to
competitive and thus eﬃcient market results.2
Much of the literature on durable-goods monopoly has focused on the question under
which conditions the Coase conjecture proves to hold and under which conditions it does
not hold. For example, Stokey (1981) and Gul, Sonnenschein, and Wilson (1986) show
that, with an inÞnite number of successive sales periods, there is an equilibrium in which
the price is (arbitrarily) close to marginal cost. Others have shown that product durabil-
ity does not necessarily reduce the monopolists market power (Ausubel and Deneckere,
1989; Bagnoli, Salant, and Swierzbinski, 1989). Güth and Ritzberger (1998) show that
a durable-goods monopolist may even increase its proÞts when the model allows for a
diﬀerence between the discount factor of the monopolist and that of the potential buyers.
Under this assumption, Güth and Ritzberger (1998) show that even over a Þnite number
of periods the monopolist may signiÞcantly increase market power, provided the buyer
has a lower discount factor. This is the so-called Pacman Conjecture (Bagnoli et al.,
1989). If the seller has a lower discount factor, he loses proÞts compared to a one-period
monopolist.
In this paper, we follow Güth and Ritzberger (1998) in that we allow for a diﬀerence in
discount factors. The usual assumption is that players have identical discount factors.
However, there is ample evidence that discount factors may be highly idiosyncratic in
1See Frank (1996) for a modern analysis.
2A similar example of intra-personal decision conßict arises in vertically related markets. An upstream
monopoly selling to multiple downstream Þrms may signiÞcantly lose its market power because of the
opportunism resulting from downstream competition (for experimental evidence, see Martin, Normann,
and Snyder, 2001).
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social environments.3 In addition, we assume that discount factors are private knowledge.
Commonly known impatience of players seems unlikelyat least, it requires further jus-
tiÞcation. How eager sellers and buyers are to obtain monetary rewards over time is
presumably diﬃcult to observe for others. So the assumption of privately known discount
factors seems less restrictive. More speciÞcally, we assume that discount factors can be
either high or low, for both the monopolist and the buyer. Which state is realized is pri-
vate information. For this scenario, we analyze a two-period game with one seller and one
buyer whos valuation is also private knowledge, and we derive the closed-form solution.
In addition, we provide experimental evidence. Experimental data may reveal to what
extent subjects behavior conforms to (rational expectations) theory but it may also show
that bounded rationality limits the predictive power of standard theory in durable-goods
games. Theory has a number of interesting implications in our market. Will sellers with
a high discount factor charge higher prices as predicted? Similarly, will buyers with a
high discount factor refuse to purchase in period one more often? Considering bounded
rationality, two kinds of behavior may be important. Firstly, because of fairness reasons,
buyer subjects may withhold demand, that is, they may reject proÞtable purchases. Such
behavior may soften the monopolists pricing behavior and may generally limit the pre-
dictive power of standard theory in durable-goods games. Secondly, it seems possible that
seller subjects might feel committed by mere intentions about their future behavioreven
when there is no formal commitment device. This again could limit the predictive power
of the theory. The conßict of a durable-goods monopolist between avoiding the eﬀects of
intra-personal price competition and reacting opportunistically and how this enters the
price expectations of the buyer seems an exciting topic of experimental analysis.
Previous experimental papers on durable-goods monopoly include Cason and Sharma
(2001), Reynolds (2000), and Güth, Ockenfels and Ritzberger (1995). Supporting the
predictions, there is strong evidence that monopolists indeed lose monopoly power when
selling a durable good. However, a large number of observations have been made which
indicate that subjects behavior is inconsistent with the predictions. Reynolds (2000)
3There is the substantial myopia or short-terminism literature. Take-over threats, career concerns
and risk considerations can induce managers not to maximize the presented discounted value of the Þrm
but to choose projects with a high return (ineﬃciently) early. Such factors are likely to diﬀer across
managers. Thus, managers ultimately operate with diﬀerent discount factors. See, e.g., Stein (1989), or
Palley (1997) containing more references.
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observed that initial prices were higher in multiperiod experiments than in single-period
monopoly experiments. In all experiments, there is more demand withholding than pre-
dicted. For example, Cason and Sharma (2001) observed more trading periods than
predicted due to higher demand withholding. Finally, durable-goods experiments seem to
require a number of repetitions due to their complexity. In Güth et al. (1995), there was
no opportunity for learning. Prices failed to conform to comparative statics predictions
and were often higher than predicted. With experienced subjects, observed prices were
closer to the prediction but participants still had serious diﬃculties to understand the
crucial aspects of such dynamic markets.
In view of these previous experiments and their results it seems important to limit at-
tention to the simple case of markets with two periods. We also have provided ample
opportunities for learning by letting participants play the same market repeatedly in our
computerized experiment. This allows us to incorporate a further complexity, namely
that relative impatience is private information.
In section 2 we derive the game-theoretic solution for two-period markets. Section 3
explains the design of the experiment whose results are described and statistically analyzed
in section 4. We summarize in section 5.
2 The basic model
The monopolistic seller has an indivisible commodity which he evaluates by 0 whereas the
only buyer evaluates the commodity by v ∈ [0, 1]. The value v is, however, the buyers
private information. The distribution of v is uniform over the unit interval [0, 1] and this
is commonly known.
We consider two successive sales periods. The discount factor ζ ∈ (0, 1) represents the
sellers weight for future (period t = 2) versus present (period t = 1) proÞt. Similarly, δ
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reßects the buyers impatience where δ ∈ (0, 1).4 We denote by p1 the price in period t
= 1 and by p2 the price in period t = 2.
The decision process is as follows:
Period t = 1:
 The seller chooses his sales price p1 ∈ [0, 1] for this period.
 Knowing p1 and her value v, the buyer decides whether or not to buy. If she does,
this ends the interaction; otherwise period t = 2 follows.
Period t = 2:
 The seller chooses his sales price p2 ∈ [0, 1] for this period.
 Knowing p2 and her value v, the buyer decides whether or not to buy. This ends
the interaction.
The proÞt of the seller is p1 if there is trade in period t = 1, it is ζp2 if trade occurs in
period t = 2, and it is 0 if there is no trade. For the buyer, the payoﬀ is v − p1 for trade
in period t = 1, δ (v − p2) for trade in period t = 1, and 0 in the case of no trade.
If both discount factors are commonly known, and if the seller is risk neutral, the solution
prices p∗1 and p
∗
2 depend on the discount factor ζ of the seller and δ of the buyer as follows:
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p∗1 =
(2− δ)2
2 [4− 2δ − ζ] , p
∗
2 =
2− δ
2 [4− 2δ − ζ ] . (1)
4Only the assumption δ < 1 is actually necessary for deriving a well-deÞned solution. The boundary
case δ = 1 can only be analyzed via δ % 1 (see Güth and Ritzberger, 1998). Note that δ = 1 renders
buying in period t = 1 or t = 2 as homogeneous trades in view of the buyer. The fact that δ = 1 cannot
be solved directly provides an example that price competition for homogeneous products should be solved
as the limiting case of such competition for heterogeneous products when heterogeneity vanishes.
5The general case of Þnitely many sales periods can be solved via backward induction and the inÞnite
horizon via approximation by letting the number of sales periods approach∞ (see Güth and Ritzberger,
1998).
4
Note that, with just one trading period, the monopoly price6 would be p∗ = 1
2
, implying
a proÞt of 1
4
. The polar cases of relative impatience correspond to
 ζ & 0 and δ % 1 with lim p∗1 = 14 = lim p∗2: as only buyers with v ≥ 12 buy in
period t = 1, the seller earns only half of what he would earn as a usual monopolist,
namely 1
4
(1
2
) = 1
8
;
 ζ % 1 and δ & 0 with lim p∗1 = 23 and lim p∗2 = 13 : the (extremely patient) seller
engages in price discrimination over time by collecting p∗1 =
2
3
whenever v is in the
interval 1 ≥ v ≥ 2
3
and p∗2 =
1
3
when 2
3
> v ≥ 1
3
. This yields an expected proÞt of¡
2
3
+ 1
3
¢ · 1
3
= 1
3
, more than the static monopoly proÞt.
We assume that discount factors are private knowledge. In addition to information about
their discount factors, players observe the following. In period t = 1 the buyer is informed
about his valuation and the sellers price oﬀer. If there is trade in period t = 1, the seller
learns that there is trade. If there is no trade in period t = 1, the buyer additionally
observes the price p2 and the seller learns whether or not she sold the commodity in
period t = 2. In order to simplify the analysis, we assume that the discount factors of
buyers and sellers can adopt only two values, low or high. That is, we assume
0 < δ < δ < 1 and 0 < ζ < ζ < 1 (2)
where the probability for δ is w ∈ (0, 1) and the one for ζ is ω ∈ (0, 1). To allow for a
clear-cut benchmark solution7 we assume that all the parameters δ, δ, ζ, ζ, w, and ω are
commonly known.
6Resulting from maximizing p (1− p) where p is the unique sales price and 1 − p the probability by
which the buyer expects his price p to be accepted due to 1− p =
1R
p
dv.
7Except for highly special games, e.g., when all players have unique undominated strategies, game-
theoretic analysis requires commonly known rules of the game.
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3 The solution
Our Þrst point is immediate but useful to note. Whenever p2 ≥ p1 the buyer would not
buy in period t = 2 as δ < 1. We therefore obtain
Proposition 1: The solution of the two-period game involves a price decrease, that is,
p1 > p2.
Given the buyers discount factor δ ∈ {δ, δ}, when will she buy the commodity? Consider
the decision to buy in period t = 1 or t = 2. If a type v ∈ [0, 1] has not bought in period
t = 1 at price p1, she will buy in period t = 2 at price p2 whenever v ≥ p2. Assume now a
type v ≥ p2 who anticipates the actual solution prices p1 and p2. Since buying in period
t = 1 yields v − p1 whereas delaying it yields δ (v − p2), type v prefers to buy early if
v − p1 ≥ δ (v − p2) or v ≥ p1 − δp2
1− δ . (3)
This establishes
Proposition 2: According to the solution play with sales prices p1 and p2,
(i) sale occurs in period t = 1 if
v ≥
½v = p1−δp2
1−δ for δ = δ
v = p1−δp2
1−δ for δ = δ
¾
(4)
and in period t = 2 if
v > v ≥ p2 for δ = δ (5)
v > v ≥ p2 for δ = δ
whereas
(ii) v < p2 implies no sales at all.
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Note that, from Proposition 1, the two thresholds v and v in Proposition 2 satisfy v < v.
Next, we discard the possibility that the seller serves only the δ-buyer types in period
t = 2. Assume, by contrast, that this is true. Then the δ-buyer would only switch between
buying at price p1 in period t = 1 and not buying at all, implying that only δ-buyers with
v ≥ p1 buy in period t = 1. But, since p1 > p2, δ-buyer types v with p1 > v ≥ p2 would
like to buy in period t = 2, contradicting the assumption that only δ-buyer types are
served in period t = 2. Thus we have proved
Proposition 3: Trade in period t = 2 involves both buyer types δ ∈ {δ, δ} with positive
probability, i.e., v > p2.
We can now proceed to derive the full solution of the game. We start by solving the last
period. Note that, in period t = 2, the seller knows that the δ
¡
δ
¢
-buyer has no value
v ≥ v(v). Thus his posterior probability of trade in period t = 2 at price p2 is
D (p2) =
(1− w) (v − p2) + w(v − p2)
(1− w)v + wv (6)
where, in view of Proposition 3, both terms of the numerator on the right hand-side above
are positive. Maximization of p2D (p2) yields
p2 = p2 (v, v) =
(1− w) v + wv
2
. (7)
Substituting p2 in (4), the equations for v and v, yields a system of two equations with
two unknowns
v =
2p1 − δwv
1− δ , v =
2p1 − δwv
1− δ . (8)
This system can readily be solved as
v = 2p1
2− δ(1 + w)− δw
4− 2(δ + δ)(1 + w) + δδ(1 + 2w) , (9)
v = 2p1
2− δ(1 + w)− δw
4− 2(δ + δ)(1 + w) + δδ(1 + 2w) . (10)
7
Since the optimal price p2 = ((1− w) v + wv)/2 depends on v and v, it can be expressed
as a function of p1 only:
p2 (p1) = p1
2− δ − 2δw
4− 2(δ + δ)(1 + w) + δδ(1 + 2w) . (11)
With the help of these derivations, the expected proÞt from trade over the two sales
periods can be deÞned as a function of p1, the price of period t = 1, namely
p1 [(1− w) (1− v (p1)) + w (1− v (p1))] + (12)
ζp2 (p1) [(1− w) (v (p1)− p2 (p1)) + w (v (p1)− p2 (p1))] ,
where, ζ ∈ {ζ, ζ}. Maximizing this function with respect to p1 yields
p1 (ζ) =
[4− 2(δ + δ)(1 + w) + δδ(1 + 2w)]2
4[2− δ − 2δw][4− 2(δ + δ)(1 + w) + δδ(1 + 2w)− ζ(1− δ/2− δw)] (13)
and thus
p2 (ζ) =
4− 2(δ + δ)(1 + w) + δδ(1 + 2w)
4[4− 2(δ + δ)(1 + w) + δδ(1 + 2w)− ζ(1− δ/2− δw)] , (14)
v (ζ) =
[2− δ(1 + w)− δw][4− 2(δ + δ)(1 + w) + δδ(1 + 2w)]
2[2− δ − 2δw][4− 2(δ + δ)(1 + w) + δδ(1 + 2w)− ζ(1− δ/2− δw)] ,
v (ζ) =
[2− δ(1 + w)− δw][4− 2(δ + δ)(1 + w) + δδ(1 + 2w)]
2[2− δ − 2δw][4− 2(δ + δ)(1 + w) + δδ(1 + 2w)− ζ(1− δ/2− δw)] .
We thus have derived the solution8 play described by
Proposition 4: For ζ ∈ {ζ, ζ}, the solution play of the two-period game is as follows
 In period t = 1, the price is p1 (ζ) which induces all buyer types v ≥ v (ζ) and δ = δ
as well as v ≥ v (ζ) and δ = δ to buy.
 In period t = 2, all buyer types v (ζ) > v ≥ p2 (ζ) and δ = δ as well as v (ζ) > v ≥
p2 (ζ) and δ = δ buy whereas
8A pooling equilibrium, based on the ex ante expected impatience parameter eζ = (1−w) ζ + wζ,
would not satisfy sequential rationality since both seller types would like to deviate from the common
price p1(eζ) as shown by our derivation.
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 all remaining buyer types abstain from trade.
According to p1 (ζ) the seller with time preference ζ ∈ {ζ, ζ} reveals his impatience by his
Þrst period price p1.9 Therefore, the buyer can rationally anticipate p2 (ζ) after observing
p1. The seller in turn only learns after the Þrst sales period whether or not the buyer has
bought in this period. Thus his demand expectations for the second sales period are as
expressed by D (p2).
4 Experimental design
Our experimental design exactly matches the above setup of the durable goods monopoly
with privately known impatience. We employ the parameters δ = ζ = 0.3, δ = ζ = 0.7,
w = ω = 0.5. These parameters imply the solution values in Þgure 1. If, as assumed
in the theory section, the buyers valuations are drawn from the unit interval, the two
columns on the left apply. In the experiment, we took buyers valuations from the interval
[50, 150]. Therefore, the absolute price prediction is according to the two columns on the
right of the Þgure 1. For the sake of plausibility of the frame, we introduced a production
cost of 50. Sellers had to choose prices from the interval [0, 200].
v ∈ [0, 1] v ∈ [50, 150]
ζ ζ ζ ζ
p1 (ζ) 0.47 0.40 97 90
p2 (ζ) 0.33 0.28 83 78
v (ζ) 0.53 0.45 103 95
v (ζ) 0.79 0.67 129 117
Table 1: Experimental Parameters.
We ran six sessions, each consisting of two matching groups. Each round was conducted
exactly as follows.10 One group consisted of three sellers and three buyers. Within
the groups, sellers and buyers were randomly rematched after every round.11 Subjects
9For the more patient seller it does not pay to mimic the price p1
¡
ζ
¢
since the additional revenue in
period t = 1 is overcompensated by the ζ-weighted revenue loss in period t = 2. For ζ = ζ the opposite
is true.
10See Appendix 6 for the translated instructions.
11Participants were not informed about the restriction of rematching within matching groups what
should have further discouraged repeated-game eﬀects.
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learned their role, seller or buyer, only after they had read the instructions, and they did
not switch roles during the experiment. In order to allow for learning, we decided to run
the experiment over 40 rounds.12
Sellers learned their discount factor, then they had to choose their price. Knowing their
discount factor, buyers had to decide whether or not to buy at the period one price, p1. If
they decided not to, period two would commence and so forth. At the end of each round,
subjects were informed about their private earnings in the previous round as well as their
cumulative earnings up to this round.
The experiments were conducted at Humboldt University, Berlin, in December 2001 and
January 2002. The 72 participants were mainly business and economics students who
were recruited via email and telephone. Payments were 16 euros on average, including a
show-up fee of 2.5 euros. Sessions lasted roughly 90 minutes.
5 Experimental results
5.1 Qualitative consistency of decisions
Let us Þrst check whether buying and pricing behavior is consistent with a few qualitative
theoretical implications. It seems worth emphasizing that consistency even with very
basic principles cannot be taken for granted in a complex durable-good setting. For
example, Güth et al. (1995) report a surprising amount of inconsistency in a durable-
goods experiment. Similarly, Reynolds (2000) emphasizes the necessity of experience with
the trading environment. Therefore, we Þnd it useful to do a consistency check Þrst.
Consider the buyers. Basic understanding of the situation implies that buyers would never
purchase at a price above their valuation. It seems impossible that some argument based
on repeated games or bounded rationality could plausibly support such loss inducing
purchases. Out of 1440 possible sales, we observed 1037 actual purchases. In all but six
12In the durable-goods experiment by Reynolds (2000), subjects interacted in 12 durable-goods markets.
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purchases, buyers had valuations above the prices. That is, there are virtually no such
loss-making purchases and we can conclude that basic buyer behavior was consistent in
this sense.13
Buyers knew that proÞts from sales made in period t = 2 are discounted. This implies
buyers with δ = 0.7 should reject a proÞtable purchase in period t = 1 more often than a
buyer with δ = 0.3.Given any path of (expected) seller prices {p1, p2}, the impatient buyer
has to purchase early more often as her second period opportunities are less attractive.
Even if we take repeated game eﬀects like demand withholding into account, it seems
implausible for the impatient buyer to reject more often because it is more costly for her
to reject in periods with low discount factors. ConÞrming this, the data14 show that in
period t = 1 buyers with δ = 0.7 reject proÞtable oﬀers (that is, oﬀers with p1 ≤ v)
signiÞcantly more often than buyers with δ = 0.3. Relative acceptance rates are lower
with δ = 0.7 for all groups, the according non-parametric test is highly signiÞcant (one-
sided Wilcoxon, p = 0.0002). We conclude that buyers do understand the basic impact
of discounting.
Now consider the sellers. Did they understand the implication of discounting? If so, sellers
with a high discount factor should charge a higher price in both periods than sellers with
a low discount factor. As shown above (see Þgure 1) this is the prediction for the solution
prices. Even if subjects do not play the solution, it should be apparent to them that a high
discount factor makes it relatively more attractive to charge a high price in period t = 1
as there is still another proÞtable opportunity to come. As both types of sellers should
(and indeed did) reduce their price in t = 2, a higher period t = 1 price for high discount
factor types also implies higher period t = 2 prices. By contrast, the impatient seller
has to make his sales early and, therefore, charges also a lower period t = 2 price. The
data show that average prices in period t = 1 were higher than period t = 2 prices in all
13In two cases buyers accepted a higher price than their valuation in period t = 2. The average loss,
−2.5, was quite small suggesting the possibility that a preference for eﬃciency might explain these loss-
making decisions; in particular, as they occurred in later rounds (16, 38). By contrast, three of the four
cases in which buyers accepted a price higher than their valuation in Þrst period occurred early (rounds
1, 1 and 7). Here, the average loss was −27. Rather than eﬃciency seeking behavior, these cases can be
seen as mistakes.
14Because of possible dependence of observations within groups, we count group averages including all
periods as one observation. Unless mentioned, all tests reported in this paper are therefore based on
matching group averages.
11
groups and in both periods. The according test is highly signiÞcant (one-sided Wilcoxon,
p = 0.006). It appears that sellers understood the impact of their own discount factor.
Proposition 1 states that sellers should charge lower prices in period t = 2 compared to
period t = 1. The intuition is that a discounting buyer has no incentive to buy at a higher
price in period t = 2. If sellers want to exploit the opportunity to sell in period t = 2, they
should lower the price. However, the prediction of a price decrease over the two periods is
not the only plausible behavior. Boundedly rational sellers may refuse to charge a lower
period t = 2 price in an attempt to solve the commitment problem.
In 750 cases, there is no trade in period t = 1 and therefore a period t = 2 price is
observed. In the vast majority of these cases, sellers indeed charged a lower price in
period t = 2. Over the entire course of the experiment, 33 out of 750 period t = 2
prices were strictly higher than p1. This Þgure gets relatively smaller over time. Over
the last 10 rounds, only 3 out of 155 period t = 2 prices were strictly higher than p1. In
many cases (13 out of 33 and 3 out of 3 cases, respectively), we observe the maximum
price of 200 in period t = 2, and all but one of these 13 observations were caused by
a single seller.15 In these cases, the higher price does not appear to be a mistake but
a signal. In addition, there are another 33 observations (7 over the last 10 rounds) in
which the price was constant over the two periods. Out of these 33 observations, 27 can
be attributed to four sellers which followed this pricing policy four or more times. Note
that we never observed a seller who regularly behaved as a one-period monopolist in the
sense of p1 = p2 = 100. To summarize, we Þnd only few violations of Proposition 1. A
few subjects occasionally charged p2 = p1 or p2 = 200 > p1. This may be interpreted as
attempts to solve the durable-goods monopolists commitment problem. The remaining
number of inconsistencies is small and scattered over time and subjects.
Result 1: Subjects behavior is consistent with several qualitative predictions. Buyers
virtually never make unproÞtable purchases. Almost all sellers systematically low-
ered prices in period t = 2. Patient buyers reject proÞtable purchases in period
t = 1 more often. Patient sellers charge higher prices in both periods.
15This seller followed a pricing policy of p1 = 75 and p2 = 200 in many rounds. With an expected
value of v of 100, this splits the surplus of 50 evenly in period t = 1. If this price is not accepted, this
seller refused to transact at all by oﬀering a price above the buyers value (p2 = 200 > 150 ≥ v).
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5.2 Buyer behavior
Let us now compare the data to the exact predictions of p1, p2, v and v. Consider buyer
behavior Þrst. Buyers withhold demand whenever an oﬀer v > p is rejected. The pre-
diction is that any price oﬀer smaller than v (in period t = 2) or smaller than v or v (in
period t = 1) should be accepted independently of the history of the game. There can
be rational and boundedly rational (or irrational) demand withholding. When v is larger
than p1 but smaller than v or v (in period t = 1), a rejection is rational. In period t = 2,
there is no rational demand withholding. While demand withholding as part of bound-
edly rational strategy has been frequently observed (see, e.g., Ruﬄe, 2000), note that,
in this experiment, demand withholding in order to establish a reputation for aggressive
buyer behavior is particularly diﬃcult. First, there is the random matching scheme and
the design does not allow to identify buyers. Moreover, sellers do not know whether their
oﬀer was rejected because of boundedly rational demand withholding or because it was
simply not proÞtable. By contrast, in many posted-oﬀer experiments, buyers evaluations
are known and demand withholding can serve much better as a signal.
v < p1 p1 ≤ v < v v ≤ v all v < p2 p2 ≤ v all
rejected 507 174 69 750 335 68 403
accepted 4 32 654 690 2 345 347
all 511 206 723 1440 337 413 750
Table 2: Acceptance numbers for diﬀerent value classiÞcation concerning p1 and p2.
Buyer behavior in period t = 2 is simple to analyze as there is no dynamic eﬀect of
decision making any more. Buyers period t = 2 behavior is also independent of δ. Any
p2 ≤ v should be accepted by all buyers. In the data, we Þnd that 68 out of 413 oﬀers
(16.5%) with p2 ≤ v were rejected (see Table 2). These oﬀers rejected typically left only
a small proÞt margin for the buyers. This margin was (v − p2)/v = 0.0693 on average of
the rejections. Two thirds of all rejections involved a margin of less than 8%. Regarding
accepted oﬀers, buyers often were willing to accept even low margins and, in four cases,
buyers accepted a period t = 2 price at which they just broke even. Two thirds of all
accepted prices gave them less than 26% proÞt margin. Buyers never rejected margins of
more than 25%.
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relative profit buyer (=(v-p2)/v)
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Figure 1: Acceptance threshold for period t = 2 on group averages (only for v ≥ p2).
Figure 1 illustrates the acceptance and rejection averages of (v − p2)/v for the twelve
groups (provided v − p2 ≥ 0). The lowest average of accepted (v − p2)/v at the group
level is 13% and the highest average of rejected (v − p2)/v at the group level is 11%. As
the acceptance and rejection average margins are not overlapping at the group level, this
suggests a threshold below and above which oﬀers are rejected and accepted respectively.
Recall that buyers knew the production cost of the seller (50). Therefore, besides the
impact of the discount factor, they were able to identify the sellers proÞt and compare
it to their own. Take buyers reaction to the median period t = 2 price, p2 = 75, as an
example. Buyers with v < 100 knew that the seller would get a larger proÞt from the
sale but they rejected only in 9 out of 38 cases (taking only buyers with v ≥ p2 = 75 into
account). Thus, it seems that aversion against disadvantageous inequality played only a
little role here.16 Nevertheless, there is demand withholding in period t = 2.
We turn to buyer behavior in period t = 1. The prediction is that, after observing the
solution p1 (ζ) , buyers with v(or v) > p1 should accept. (Henceforth, we will refer to v
whenever we want make a statement about v or v.) For out-of-equilibrium p1, buyers
with v(p1) > p1 and v(p1) > p1 should accept. The corresponding numbers are listed in
Þgure 2. First, consider buyers with v > v > p1 which are predicted to reject (rational
demand withholding). Out of 206 cases, buyers rejected in 174 cases (84.5%). That
is, to a large extent, buyers behavior was in accordance with the theory. There are,
16This suggests that inequality aversion (Bolton, 1991) loses inßuence in situations where at least some
individual payments are private information or diﬃcult to guess.
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however, some inconsistencies, namely the 32 accepted oﬀers yielding a proÞt margin of
(v − p1)/v = 0.159. These buyers did not realize that a lower period t = 2 price should
have given them a higher discounted margin. Second, did buyers with v ≥ v accept? If
(v− v)/v > 0, 90% of all oﬀers were accepted (see Table 2 again). If (v− v)/v > 0.1, 96%
of all oﬀers were accepted. The average margin rejected was (v−p1)/v = 0.115. Note that
this margin is larger than the one in period t = 2, so there is more demand withholding
in period 1.
Result 2: Buyers behavior is to a large extent consistent with the prediction. Buyers
usually accepted proÞtable oﬀers in period t = 2 while, in period t = 1, they
accepted only if the oﬀer gave them a more than positive proÞt margin. Both in
period t = 1 and t = 2, there is some irrational (or boundedly rational) demand
withholding.
5.3 Seller behavior
Now consider seller behavior. We report deviations from the (conditional) predictions
rather than absolute values because the optimal prices p2 depend on the realization of p1,
and p1 is often diﬀerent from the predictions p1
¡
ζ
¢
= 90 and p1
¡
ζ
¢
= 97. Accordingly,
we refer to p2 (p1) rather than p2
¡
ζ
¢
and p2
¡
ζ
¢
, and we deÞne ∆p1 (ζ) = p1 − p1 (ζ),
∆p2 = p2− p2(p1). Note that ∆p2 does only depend on p1 but not on the realization of ζ.
We Þnd that ∆p1
¡
ζ
¢
= −4.73 (standard deviation: 5.52), ∆p1
¡
ζ
¢
= −6.46 (5.56), and
∆p2 = +0.89 (5.88).
17 In absolute terms, the average prices charged are p1
¡
ζ
¢
= 84 and
p1
¡
ζ
¢
= 91. These are lower than the predicted values. Concluding from the standard
deviations, it appears that ∆p1
¡
ζ
¢
and ∆p1
¡
ζ
¢
are signiÞcantly below the prediction of
zero.
Given that buyers charged prices in period t = 1 partly far away from the prediction, it is
more diﬃcult to analyze period t = 2 pricing behavior. If we interpret the p1 /∈ {90, 97} as
17The reported numbers are group averages. Individual averages have the same means for ∆p1. As the
numbers of trades continued in period t = 2 diﬀers within groups, for individual observations the mean
also slightly diﬀers: ∆p2 = +0.79.
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Figure 2: ∆p1 and ∆p2 average for all matching groups.
decision errors, and if we assume that both buyers and sellers behave fully rational in the
continuation game, then the appropriate period t = 2 price is p2(p1) as in equation (11).
As mentioned, we report the diﬀerence between actual price in t = 2 and this prediction:
∆p2 = p2 − p2(p1). Now, ∆p2 = 0.89 is surprisingly small what we interpret as support
of rationality theory whenever the situation is simple enough (in t = 2 sellers do not have
to anticipate own future choices any longer). But there is much variability in individual
decisions. Regrading group averages, Þgure 2 shows that there all except one group have
a rather small ∆p2 while the ∆p1 observations are more dispersed and clearly negative.
The fact that ∆p2 average is slightly positive does not mean that pricing behavior in
period t = 2 changes qualitatively from that in period t = 1. Sellers start with a lower
price and they reduce the price by the proportion predicted. Hence, whatever accounts
for the lower prices in period t = 1, this behavior carries over to period t = 2.
Result 3: Sellers charge lower prices than predicted, both in period t = 1 and period
t = 2. The reduction of period t = 2 prices is consistent with the (conditional)
rationality.
To conclude the analysis of seller behavior, the only signiÞcant deviation from the predic-
tion are the lower period t = 1 prices. This is a robust Þnding in that it is very similar for
both discount rates ζ and ζ. Instead of a continuous demand function, we have assumed
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a single buyer whose value is private information. The density of the value plays the role
of the continuous demand function. Theoretically, this does not matter much for the out-
come but this may matter behaviorally as in such bilateral encounters fairness concerns
may become stronger, and this could account for low Þrst period prices. Alternatively,
risk considerations (an attitude of sellers to ensure trade) may explain the result. We did
not control for fairness concerns or risk aversion of sellers. Because the buyers valuation
is private knowledge, sellers only know the expected buyer proÞt. Though it is possible
for buyers to make inter-personal proÞt comparison, it is relatively complex to do so and,
regarding proÞts made in the second period, there is uncertainty about the discount fac-
tor. Therefore, compared to pure bargaining experiments, it seems less likely that fairness
matters and the lower period t = 1 prices may rather reßect the risk attitude of sellers.
5.4 Impact of the discount factors
We Þnally analyze the impact of the distribution of the discount factors. It is a central
feature of our model that the discount factor of the seller as compared to the buyers
determines whether the seller suﬀers from intra-personal competition or gains by price
discrimination. In this sense, a higher discount factor implies higher power, aﬀecting
both acceptance rates and proÞts. Above, we already reported the impact of discount
factors, separately for buyers and sellers. Here, we compare acceptance rates and proÞts
for all (ζ , δ) seller-buyer combinations.
We start with the percentage of accepted oﬀers. Let at(ζ, δ) denote the rate of acceptance
for some (ζ , δ) seller-buyer combination in period t. Theory predicts that sellers with
a high discount factor charge higher prices both in period t = 1 and period t = 2,
and that buyers with a high discount factor reject proÞtable purchases in period t =
1 more often. This immediately implies that, in period t = 1, a1(ζ, δ) should have
the smallest acceptance rate and a1(ζ, δ) should have the highest, while a1(ζ, δ) and
a1(ζ, δ) should be intermediate. Deducing acceptances rates from Þgure 1, the prediction
is a1(ζ, δ) < a1(ζ , δ). This turns out to hold in our data. The acceptance rates for the
four combinations in Þgure 3 show that, indeed, a1(ζ, δ)
(.011)
< a1(ζ, δ)
(.021)
< a1(ζ, δ)
(.001)
<
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Figure 3: Acceptance rates (period t = 1 ; t = 2) for all discount factor constellations.
a1(ζ, δ) with corresponding signiÞcance level of the one-sided Wilcoxon tests above the
inequality signs. Intuitively, the acceptance rates in period t = 2 must exhibit the opposite
inequality signs: if there are fewer acceptances in period t = 1, more buyers are left to
accept in period t = 2. In accordance with this intuition, one can deduce a2(ζ, δ) >
a2(ζ, δ) > a2(ζ, δ) > a2(ζ, δ) from Þgure 1. We Þnd that a2(ζ, δ)
(.032)
> a2(ζ, δ) signiÞcantly
(one-sided Wilcoxon test) as predicted, but neiter a2(ζ , δ) > a2(ζ, δ) (as predicted) nor
a2(ζ, δ) > a2(ζ, δ) (not predicted) were signiÞcant.
Now consider proÞts. Predictions are simple. Given the discount factor of the other
player, a high own discount factor implies a higher proÞt. Given the own discount factor,
a high discount factor of the other player implies a lower proÞt. It turns out that this
holds in the experimental data for all possible (ζ, δ) combinations. That is, though high
and low discount factor types can actually realize the same proÞt in period t = 1, high
discount factor types make larger proÞts because of the trade shifted to period t = 2. Let
uS (ζ, δ) and uB (ζ, δ) indicate the average proÞts made by sellers and buyers, respectively,
in a (ζ, δ) seller-buyer encounter. The average uS (ζ, δ) was roughly 19 and the average
uB (ζ, δ) was about 21. The following inequalities are signiÞcant (with the corresponding
signiÞcance level of the one-sided Wilcoxon tests above the inequality signs). We Þnd
that uS
¡
ζ, δ
¢ (.002)
> uS
¡
ζ, δ
¢ (.076)
> uS
¡
ζ, δ
¢
, and uS
¡
ζ, δ
¢ (.0005)
> uS
¡
ζ, δ
¢
for the seller,
and uB
¡
ζ, δ
¢ (.008)
> uB
¡
ζ , δ
¢
, and uB
¡
ζ , δ
¢ (.005)
> uB
¡
ζ, δ
¢
for the buyer. Further, we Þnd
uS
¡
ζ, δ
¢ (.021)
> uS
¡
ζ, δ
¢
and uB
¡
ζ, δ
¢ (.055)
> uB
¡
ζ, δ
¢
because of the high rejection rates
which a
¡
ζ, δ
¢
combination implies.
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Result 4: High discount factors of either the seller or the buyer reduce the probability of
a successful trade in period t = 1. Nevertheless, participants realize higher average
earnings if their opponent has a low discount factor.
6 Conclusions
The literature substantiating the intuition of Coases (1972) durable-goods monopolist has
inspired much theory but only few experiments. In this paper, we have extended both
lines of research. We solve, for the Þrst time, the simplest case where discount factors are
private information. Secondly, by conducting a laboratory experiment, we provide a test
of the theory.
Participants behaved rather reasonably according to qualitative predictionspossibly be-
cause we provided enough opportunity for learning. There are few unproÞtable purchases
and there are generally lower prices in the second period as predicted. Furthermore, par-
ticipants reacted adequately to changes in discount factors (within-subject comparisons)
and, as buyers, maintained higher acceptance thresholds in the Þrst than in the second
period. Ceteris paribus, a higher discount factor of at least one player shifts more trade
to the second period. Whenever the situation becomes rather simple, as for instance in
the second period, conditional rationality can account for most of the decision data.
It has already been indicated in the Introduction that we view durable-goods monopolies
as very intriguing. They challenge the conventional wisdom that several competitors
are needed to induce competitive outcomes; they are also philosophically challenging by
claiming intra-personal price competition. After all, it is due to rational anticipation of
own future behavior that the monopolist may earn so much less than a usual monopolist.
It seems remarkable that such surprising insight seems to be well understood by the
participants.
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Appendix: Instructions
The experiment was conducted in German and the original experimental instructions were
also in German. This is a shortened18 translated version of the instructions. Participants
read the paper instructions before the computerized experiment started. In the beginning
of the instructions, subjects were informed that the instructions are the same for every
participant, they receive an initial endowment of DM 5, that wins and losses from all
periods would be added, the exchange rate from ECU (Experimental Currency Unit) to
DM: 30 ECU = DM 1, that communication was not allowed and questions would be
answered privately and that all decisions will be treated anonymously. Then the main
instructions started.
Two parties, a seller S and a buyer B negotiate in each period about the sale of a product.
The buyers product value v is 50 ≤ v ≤ 150 (all in ECU). The valuation is the payoﬀ a
buyer receives if he purchases the product. In each period there will be a new v drawn
from this interval, with all values being equally likely. The seller has production costs of
50 id he sells the good.
Whether you act as S or B is determined randomly at the beginning of the experiment.
You will keep your role for the whole experiment. You will interact in total over 40 periods.
Your bargaining partner will every time be randomly determined at the beginning of each
period.
Trade takes place according to the following rules:
1. S decides about the price p1 with 0 ≤ p1 ≤ 200 within a Þrst sales opportunity.
2. B decides whether to buy and pay p1 or not.
(a) If B purchase the product, S receives p1 − 50. B receives v and pays p1 , i.e.,
his proÞt is v − p1.
The period is over.
18The complete German instructions are avaliable at request.
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(b) If B does not purchase, there will be a second sales opportunity. In this case
S decides about a second price p2 with 0 ≤ p2 ≤ 200 . B decides whether to
buy and pay p2 or not to buy at all.
i. If B purchase the product, S receives a discounted proÞt ζ (p2 − 50) . B
receives v and pays p2 , i.e., his discounted proÞt is δ (v − p2).
(The discount rates ζ and δ of the seller and the buyer, respectively, specify
with which factor the proÞt from the second sales opportunity is multi-
plied.)
ii. If B does not purchase (i.e., not to buy at all), both parties receive zero
proÞts.
The period is over.
[At this point, the decision process is also graphically illustrated.]
There are only two values possible for both discount rates ζ and δ , namely 0.3 and 0.7.
Possible (ζ , δ ) constellations are therefore (0.3, 0.3), (0.3, 0.7), (0.7, 0.3), and (0.7, 0.7).
The likelihood for both discount rates values is the same and are randomly determined
at the beginning of each period independently for the seller and the buyer. All four
constellations have the same probability. Only S knows which of the two values ζ has.
Correspondingly only B knows his realized δ value.
At the beginning of each period you are, according to your role, informed about:
 As seller S: Your discount rate ζ.
 As buyer B: Your discount rate δ.
and your valuation for the product v.
At the end of each period you will be informed about your proÞt at each period and your
total payoﬀs.
Thank you for participation!
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